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Abstract
Human capital has become the principal competitive
advantage for many businesses in today's increasingly
specialized marketplace. In order to protect human
capital, no-hire agreements have become boilerplate
provisions in many types of contracts. Despite their
prevalence, these agreements have not been uniformly and
predictably enforceable, due to conflicting methods of
interpretation from state to state. Depending on the state,
one of three approaches will be employed to determine
enforceability: (1) the antitrust approach, (2) the contracts
in restraint of trade approach, or (3) the covenants not to
compete approach. Over the past several decades, the
contracts in restraint of trade and covenants not to
compete approach have been the predominant methods of
interpretation. Nevertheless, several recent cases employed
the antitrust approach, suggesting that it may still be a
viable option. This note examines the enforceability of no-
hires under each of these approaches. Specifically, this
note evaluates the enforceability of no-hires executed in
merger agreements as well as those executed ancillary to
employee staffing contracts. Additionally, this note
discusses the increased potential for forum shopping as a
technique to successfully challenge enforceability.
I. INTRODUCTION
"Increasingly, the true value of corporate assets being bought and
sold lies in 'human capital,' that is, the knowledge, technical expertise, and
collective experience of a company's employees."' Because human capital
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1 Brian R. Henry & Joseph M. Miller, "Sorry, We Can't Hire You... We Promised Not
To ": The Antitrust Implications of Entering Into No-Hire Agreements, 11 ANTITRUST
FALL 1996, at 39.
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often provides a firm's competitive advantage, it is frequently the prime
target of a potential acquirer or competing business.2 This note examines
the enforceability of a contractual provision designed to protect human
capital, commonly referred to as a "no-hire" or "no-switching" provision.
3
No-hire provisions ("no-hires") are common in a variety of
business agreements. However, this Note will focus on two scenarios that
relate closely to entrepreneurship. The first scenario involves a corporation
that is considering a merger or acquisition. If a corporation is looking to be
acquired, the corporation has a strong interest in introducing the potential
suitor to key employees to highlight the employees' unique skills. 4 This
information, and the employees' talents, are valuable and may increase the
attractiveness of the deal.5 Moreover, acquirers realize that the physical
assets they purchase are less valuable without experienced personnel to
manage them.6 However, the corporation also must be careful not to reveal
too much, in order to protect their human capital should deal negotiations
crumble. Because of this dilemma, it is standard for companies to require
the potential acquirer to agree to a no-hire agreement which prevents the
other party from "poaching" key employees. 8 No-hires thus facilitate
information sharing and increase the probability that a mutually appealing
deal will be reached.
Similarly, the acquirer also has an interest in utilizing a no-hire
agreement, although for a somewhat different purpose. Assuming the
acquisition is successful, the acquiring corporation possesses an interest in
retaining the human capital that was purchased. 9 Specifically, the acquiring
company faces the risk that the seller could rehire the employees, stripping
much of the value from the acquisition.10  Therefore, acquirers also
frequently insist on the execution of no-hires.
The second scenario involving no-hires arises when one company
executes a contract to provide temporary employees or employee services
2 Rob Garver, Merge Right: Numbers Don't Drive Deals. People Do., CFO MAG., Feb.
15, 2006 at 12.
3 In many instances, there are additional contractual provisions executed to protect
business assets, such as confidentiality agreements and other employment agreements.
However, the enforceability of these agreements is outside the scope of this analysis.
4 James Wright, Pitfalls of Poaching Employees After a Deal Craters; Luring talent
from a suitor, or losing employees after deal talks crumble presents risks for both
companies, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONs, Apr. 1, 2007, at 88.
51Id.
6 Henry & Miller, supra note 1, at 39.
7 Wright, supra note 4, at 88.
8 See Henry & Miller, supra note 1, at 39.
91d.
1o Id.
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to another company." In this situation, the supplier will often demand a
no-hire provision to prevent the purchaser from simply hiring the
employees and cutting out the "middle-man" services of the supplier. 
12
Unfortunately for sellers, purchasers, and suppliers, the
enforceability of these agreements varies from state to state. This
inconsistency is due to the fact that courts across the nation have not agreed
upon the proper method to analyze no-hire agreements.' 3 Two conflicting
legal principles frame this discussion and highlight the problem of
enforceability. 4 The first involves freedom of association, and the right of
an employee to accept the job of her choice. Many courts are highly
protective of an employee's right to work. The second involves freedom of
contract and the right of an employer to protect its assets and remain free
from unfair competition. 5 Many courts are sympathetic to this right as
well, but often require narrowly tailored provisions and strike down
overbroad prohibitions.
II. THE COMPETING APPROACHES
Historically, courts would apply legal principles of antitrust law to
analyze no-hire agreements.' 6 Under this approach the critical issue is
whether the agreement constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade.' 7 This
analysis generally focuses on the big picture-how the enforcement of such
provisions could potentially affect trade as a whole, as opposed to the effect
on individuals. 18 However, over the past several decades state courts have
largely moved away from applying antitrust principles, and adopted one of
the two competing approaches: (1) state law governing contracts in restraint
of trade, or (2) state law governing restrictive covenants. Nevertheless,
despite the prevalence of these modem approaches, two cases decided in
2007 suggest that the antitrust approach may be reviving.' 9 It is yet to be
1 David K. Haase & Darren M. Mungerson, Agreements Between Employers Not To
Hire Each Other's Employees: When Are They Enforceable?, 21 LAB. LAW. 277, 277
(2006).
12Id.
13 id
4 Wright, supra note 4, at 89.
'5 Id.
16 Haase & Mungerson, supra note 11, at 277.
17 id.
18 1d
"
19 See, Deich-Keibler v. Bank One, 243 Fed.Appx. 164, 165 (7th Cir. 2007); Eichom v.
AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2007) (In Eichorn, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals had to decide whether defendant's agreement to restrict the hiring of certain
employees, upon the former employer's sale of the company, was a violation of § 1 of
the Sherman Act. Most importantly, the Court determined that the plaintiffs were
injured, and had
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seen if those decisions are an anomaly, or if they represent the genesis of a
new trend. Either way, understanding the antitrust approach is critical,
because it established the foundation for the reasonableness analysis
employed by the contracts in restraint of trade approach.
Regardless of which approach is used, the reasonableness of the no-
hire provision is central to determining its enforceability. However, the
emphasis and scope of the reasonableness analysis varies depending on the
approach. Under the restraint of trade approach, the reasonableness
analysis is focused on the potential harm to society if such provisions were
routinely enforced, rather than the harm to specific individuals. 20 Because
of the broad focus, this approach is more closely aligned with the antitrust
approach.2' Additionally, this approach is generally beneficial for parties
seeking enforcement, because it is easier to demonstrate that enforcement
of the provision is reasonable, necessary, and not potentially harmful to
society. This contrasts with the more stringent individually-focused
reasonableness analysis employed under the restrictive covenant
approach.22
The second predominant approach analogizes no-hires to restrictive
covenants between employers and employees and applies the applicable
23state law governing such agreements. The enforceability of restrictive
covenants varies significantly from state to state. However, in general, an
agreement that contains post-employment restrictive covenants will be
enforceable if it is reasonably necessary to protect the employer and not
unduly harmful to the employee. 24  This approach is generally less
preferable for those seeking enforcement, for two reasons. First, different
states apply different standards to determine what is "reasonably
necessary." This variation can lead to inconsistent enforceability. Second,
this approach emphasizes the reasonableness and necessity of the
restrictions on the individual, rather than the potential impact on society.
25
standing to sue under the Sherman Act. However, the Court determined that there was
not a violation of the Act, because (1) the agreement was reasonable in scope and (2)
the primary purpose of the agreement was to ensure the successful and uninterrupted
acquisition of the company, whose business required workforce continuity.
Consequently, any restraint on plaintiffs' ability to seek employment was incidental to
the effective sale of the company); See also, Roman v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d
542, 545 (10th Cir. 1995).
20 Haase & Mungerson, supra note I1, at 277.
21 id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Roger T. Brice & Burton L. Reiter, Prac. L. Inst., Drafting Employment-Related
Agreements, 227 (2007). Many states will enforce the agreements if they are
reasonably necessary to protect the employer's protectable interests - generally
described as being confidential, competitively valuable information and customer
contacts or goodwill.
25 Haase & Mungerson, supra note 11, at 279.
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As a corollary of the previous discussion, it is easier to demonstrate harm to
an individual, as opposed to the potential harm to society if such
agreements were routinely enforced.
Due to the conflicting methods of analysis, generally an agreement
that is unenforceable under the contracts in restraint of trade approach will
also be unenforceable under the restrictive covenant approach.26 However,
the inverse is not necessarily true.27 Since the restraint of trade analysis is
generally easier to satisfy, it may be the case that a no-hire that is
enforceable under this approach may be unenforceable under the restrictive
covenants approach.28
A. The Antitrust Approach
Despite the prevalence of the two principal approaches, two cases
decided in 2007 in the Third and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals suggest
that the antitrust approach may once again be a viable option to contest
enforcement of no-hires.29  The Third Circuit case involved a no-hire
agreement between AT&T and one of its affiliates that it was looking to
sell, Paradyne Corporation.3 ° In order to market Paradyne, AT&T adopted
a human resource plan that precluded AT&T from rehiring any Paradyne
employee who left voluntarily for 8 months following the acquisition.3 1
Shortly thereafter, Paradyne was acquired by the Texas Pacific Group.
32
Acquiring the technical skills of Paradyne's employees was central to the
acquisition for Texas Pacific Group. 3
Subsequently, AT&T was sued by several former Paradyne
employees, alleging multiple harms.34 For the sake of this analysis, the
most important claim was an alleged violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.35
"In order to assert a cause of action under § 1, plaintiffs must prove they
have suffered an antitrust injury that is causally related to the defendant's
allegedly illegal anti-competitive activity. '36 An antitrust injury is an injury
which naturally flows from that which makes a defendant's acts unlawful-
promoting unfair competition.3 7  Then, if an antitrust injury is found to
26 Id. at 280.
27 Id. at 280-81.
28 Id. at 280.29 Eichorn, 248 F.3d at 136; Deich-Keibler, 243 Fed.Appx. at 165.
30 Eichorn, 248 F.3d at 136.
31 Id. (For AT&T, the human resource plan effectively operated as a no-hire provision
between itself and Paradyne).
32 Id.
3 3 Id. at 137.
34 Eichorn, 248 F.3d at 137.
35 Id.
36 Eichorn, 248 F.3d at 137 (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429
U.S. 477, 489 (1977)).37 Brunswick Corp. 429 U.S. at 489 (1977).
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exist, the next step is to apply the rule of reason.38 Upon application of the
test, the Court determined that the plaintiffs had suffered an antitrust injury,
and had standing to sue under the Sherman Act. However, the Court also
determined that the agreement satisfied the rule of reason, and was
nevertheless enforceable, because (1) the agreement was reasonable in
scope and (2) the primary purpose of the agreement was to ensure
workforce continuity at Texas Pacific Group, not stifle competition.39
Consequently, any restraint on plaintiffs' ability to seek employment was
incidental to the effective sale of the company.
40
41The Seventh Circuit case involved a similar fact pattern. In
Deich-Keibler, the no-hire agreement was executed between Bank One and
RBC, in connection with RBC's acquisition of Bank One's mortgage loan
sales division.42 In negotiating the acquisition, RBC and Bank One
executed a no-hire that restricted Bank One from rehiring any of the
employees that RBC offered a job, for a period of 180 days.4 3 Following
the acquisition, several Bank One employees refused the offer from RBC,
and sought employment with another division of Bank One. 44 When the
employees learned that Bank One was contractually prohibited from hiring
them, they filed suit alleging multiple claims.45 For the purpose of this
analysis, the most important claim was the assertion that the no-hire
provision was an unlawful restraint of trade in violation of Indiana's
antitrust act, I.C. § 24-1-2-1.46
First, the court noted that the Indiana Antitrust Act was modeled
after the Sherman Antitrust Act, and had been interpreted consistently with
the Sherman Act.4 7 As previously discussed, in order to succeed in their
antitrust claim plaintiffs must demonstrate the existence of an antitrust
injury.48 In the case at bar, there was no evidence suggesting that anti-
competitiveness was the purpose of the no-hire agreement.49 Therefore, the
court determined that plaintiffs had not demonstrated an antitrust injury and
defendants were entitled to summary judgment regarding the antitrust
claim.5
0
38 Eichorn, 248 F.3d at 138 (citing United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596,
606 (1972)).
39 Eichorn, 248 F.3d at 146.
40 id.
41 Deich-Keibler, 243 Fed.Appx. at 164, 165.
42 id.
43 id.
44id.
45 id.
46 Deich-Keibler, 243 Fed. Appx. at 1684 7 Id.
48 id.
49 id.
50 id.
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Although the antitrust challenges in both Eichorn and Deich-
Keibler were unsuccessful, both cases are nevertheless significant. In each
case the Court carefully scrutinized the antitrust claims, suggesting that the
antitrust approach could potentially be successful in challenging the
enforceability of a no-hire. In both cases the courts discussed the necessity
of such agreements to effectively facilitate the merger. Moving forward, it
may be worthwhile for a plaintiff to challenge enforceability according to
principles of antitrust law, especially if the business necessity for
enforcement is not strong and the likelihood of success under another
approach is weak.
Unfortunately for the party contesting enforcement, the result in
both of these cases also appears to be part of a larger trend. Regardless of
the decade or the approach, a party seeking enforcement of a no-hire
agreement executed ancillary to a merger has a strong likelihood of
success. 51 Necessity is frequently the justification for this result, because a
rational buyer will be wary to invest if his targeted asset, human capital,
could disappear shortly after the close of the transaction.5 2 Therefore, most
courts will enforce no-hires executed ancillary to the sale of a business, so
long as they are reasonable, in order to provide an incentive for individuals
to invest in human capital.
53
However, this author has not discovered any recent cases
employing an antitrust argument to challenge the enforceability of a no-hire
involving an employee staffing/service contract. In general, no-hires in
these types of situations have been found unenforceable more often than
no-hires executed ancillary to the sale of a business. Therefore, it may be
worth pursuing an antitrust challenge in this type of situation.
B. The Restraint of Trade Approach
Despite the two cases from 2007, many courts addressing no-hires
in the past several decades have analyzed enforceability under restraint of
trade principles.5 4 Under this approach, an agreement will generally be
enforceable if it is reasonable in duration and scope, and operates to serve a
legitimate business purpose. 55  However, the enforceability of the
51 See Henry & Miller, supra note 1, at 40.52 Id.; See generally Cesnik v. Chrysler Corp., 490 F.Supp 859 (1980). Chrysler sold the
assets from its Airtemp Division to the Fedders Corporation. As part of the sale, the
companies executed a no-hire agreement, wherein Chrysler agreed not to hire any of its
former employees from the Airtemp division. This agreement was challenged under the
Sherman Act. Although the Court determined that the employees had standing to sue
under § I of the Sherman Act, the court denied relief to plaintiffs. The result was based
on the fact that the restraint was reasonably necessary for Fedders to protect the human
capital that he purchased.
53 See, Henry & Miller, supra note 1, at 40.
54 Haase & Mungerson, supra note 11, at 285.55 id.
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agreement will also depend on the potential anticompetitive effect on the
market, if such agreements were routinely enforceable. 6
To assess the potential effect on the market, the first task is to
determine the breadth of the relevant market.57 Typically, the market will
be defined as the market for the services of the employees affected by the
agreement.5 8  Additionally, it is also useful to examine the duration,
geographic scope, and the alternative employment opportunities available
to the affected individuals. 59  Although there are not rigid guidelines
regarding these factors, reasonable restrictions and alternative employment
opportunities add weight to the argument for enforceability. In contrast, the
biggest threat to enforceability involves contracts restricting employees
who are extremely specialized or skilled, so that they may only be
employed by a small percentage of employers. A challenge involving
such a uniquely skilled employee may lead to an agreement being struck
down under restraint of trade principles, because society may be adversely
affected if a significant percentage of the available work force for a given
market is restricted from employment.6 1
1. Applying Restraint of Trade Principles to Mergers & Acquisitions
Courts applying restraint of trade principles have also recognized
the economic necessity of enforcing no-hire agreements executed ancillary
to a merger. It would be economically inefficient and undesirable not to
protect human capital bargained for in an acquisition. 62 If the human
capital acquired in such a deal was left unprotected, such a rule would
likely have a chilling effect on the acquisitions and investment community,
and impede otherwise desirable business combinations.
However, until as recently as December of 2006, this conclusion
was not uniformly recognized. In late 2006, the Alabama Supreme Court
overruled a prior decision concluding that a no-hire agreement was per se
void unless accompanied by an underlying employer/employee covenant
not to compete.6 3 The rationale behind the old Alabama rule was that it
would be unfair to restrict an employee's rights without notice by
contracting with another employer, when the same result could be reached
56 Id. at 278.
57 See, Henry & Miller, supra note 1, at 41.58 id.
59 Id.60 Id.
61 id
62 See Henry & Miller, supra note 1, at 41.
63 Exparte Howell Eng'g & Surveying, Inc., 2006 Ala. LEXIS 346, at *25 (Ala. 2006)
(overruling Dyson Conveyor Maint., Inc. v. Young & Vann Supply Co., 529 So.2d 212
(Ala. 1988)).
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through a direct non-competition agreement with the employee. 64 Although
this decision has been overruled, at least one other court has considered the
requirement of notice to the affected employee and held it to be a
prerequisite to enforceability.65 However, Heyde did not involve a no-hire
executed ancillary to the sale of a business.66
2. Applying Restraint of Trade Principles to Employee Staffing
Contracts
Contrary to the widespread approval of no-hires executed ancillary
to a merger, there have been a handful of courts that have refused to enforce
no-hires when they involve a contractual arrangement wherein one
company provides services or employees to another company. The
unwillingness to enforce such agreements highlights the conflict between
the two underlying legal principles. It is difficult to strike a harmonious
balance between the right of employees to accept jobs of their choice, and
the right of employers to enter contracts and protect their assets.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota is one court that has strictly
interpreted such agreements, concluding that such contractual arrangements
are per se void under South Dakota's restraint of trade statute.67 This rule
emanated from a 1998 case wherein plaintiff computer company CTS,
contracted to provide computer services to defendant Gateway. 68  The
agreement contained a no-hire that restricted Gateway from hiring,
soliciting, or recruiting any employee of CTS for the duration of the
contract and one year thereafter.69 Subsequently, a former CTS employee
became employed with Gateway, and CTS brought suit to enforce the no-
hire.70
The South Dakota Supreme Court determined that although the no-
hire was similar to a non-competition agreement, the proper method to
interpret the provision was under restraint of trade principles. 71 Although
CTS argued that the no-hire fit within the employer/employee restrictive
covenant exception to the restraint of trade statute, the South Dakota
Supreme Court explicitly rejected this rationale, concluding that the
64 Dyson Conveyor Maint, 529 So.2d at 215.
65 See Heyde Companies, Inc. v. Dove Healthcare, LLC, 654 N.W.2d 830, 844 (Wis.
2002). The Wisconsin Supreme Court struck down the no-hire because the employee
did not receive notice of the restriction. However, the case did not involve a no-hire
ancillary to a merger. Heyde will be discussed in more detail later in this analysis.
66 This author has not discovered another case in any jurisdiction that has refused to
enforce a no-hire executed ancillary to a merger under restraint of trade principles.
67 Communication Tech. Sys. v. Densmore, 583 N.W.2d 125, 128-29 (S.D. 1998).
61Id. at 126.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 127.
2008]
122 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LA W [Vol. 3:1
JOURNAL
exception did not apply to an agreement between an employer and its
customers.72
This decision is unique because it is the only case this author
discovered where a no-hire would have been easier to enforce under state
restrictive covenant laws.73 As previously discussed, this is abnormal
because a reasonableness analysis under state restrictive covenant laws is
generally more rigorous. This author has not discovered support for the
South Dakota approach in any other jurisdiction.
In Georgia, the Court of Appeals applied similar logic to a slightly
different factual scenario, striking down a no-hire as an unreasonable
restraint of trade.7 4 In the Club Properties case, the two parties entered into
a lease agreement, which called for liquidated damages if the lessee,
Atlanta Offices-Perimeter, Inc., hired any of the lessor's employees.75
Upon expiration of the lease, one of the lessor's employees went to work
for the lessee.76 Club Properties then sued Atlanta Offices to recover
liquidated damages pursuant to the terms of the contract.
77
The Georgia Court of Appeals concluded that regardless of what
the parties called the provision, the liquidated damages clause operated as a
restraint of trade.78 According to Georgia law, the court then applied the
"rule of reason," to determine if the agreement was enforceable as a partial
and reasonable restraint of trade. 79 To satisfy the rule of reason in Georgia,
the restraint must be reasonable "as to limitation of time, territory and
proscribed activities., 80 The court then struck down the agreement because
it did not contain any temporal limitation, and thus Atlanta Offices would
never be able to hire a new employee without first determining whether she
had been employed by Club Properties during the preceding six-month
period.
81
In 2007, a similar liquidated damages provision was struck down in
California as an unreasonable restraint of trade.82 In the VL Systems case,
the parties entered into an agreement that restricted Star Trac from hiring
any employee of VL Systems for one year following the termination of the
contract.83 Within that period, Star Trac breached the agreement and hired
72 Id. at 130.
73 See Densmore, 583 N.W.2d at 125; Haase & Mungerson, supra note 11, at 295.
74 Club Properties Inc., v. Atlanta Offices-Perimeter Inc., 348 S.E.2d 919, 922 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1986).
" Id. at 920.
76 id.
77 id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 922.
80 Club Properties, 348 S.E.2d at 922 (citing Durham v. Stand-By Labor of Georgia
Inc., 230 Ga. 558, 561 (Ga. 1973)).8' Club Properties, 348 S.E.2d at 922.
82 VL Sys., Inc. v. Unisen, Inc., 152 Cal. App. 4th 708, 718 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
83 Id. at 709-10.
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an employee of VL Systems. 84 First, the California court distinguished the
agreement from a non-competition agreement because it was between
employers, not an employer and an employee. 85 The court then determined
that regardless of what the provision was called, it constituted an illegal
restraint of trade, in violation of California Business and Professional Code
§ 16600.86 This conclusion was based on the finding that the provision was
unnecessarily broad, and the need for enforcement was outweighed by the
public policy interest in promoting the mobility of employees.87
C. The Restrictive Covenant Approach
The second principal approach to analyze the enforceability of no-
hires is to analogize the no-hire provision to a restrictive covenant and
apply state law governing enforceability of those agreements. 88  Since
restrictive covenants are a matter of state law, the enforceability of no-hires
varies from state to state. Specifically, enforceability depends on the state's
interpretation of "reasonableness." 89 Generally, the reasonableness inquiry
emphasizes the potential harm to the individual and requires limits on
geographic scope, duration, and on the type of activities being restricted.90
Additionally, most states also require that the agreement be reasonably
necessary to protect an employer's legitimate protectable interests.9'
Protectable interests are typically described as being confidential,
competitively valuable (i.e., trade secret) information and customer contacts
or goodwill.92 As previously mentioned, this approach leads to more
agreements being held unenforceable.
The body of law regulating restrictive covenants is largely
concerned with non-competition agreements. In many states, these types of
agreements are carefully scrutinized by courts because of their restrictive
effect on an individual's ability to earn a livelihood.93  The rigor of the
scrutiny applied highlights the two legal policies underlying this article.
841d. at 710.
85 Id. at 714.
861d. at 718.
87 Id. It is important to note that although this provision was struck down, the Court was
careful to state that reasonably limited restrictions that tend to promote trade may be
enforceable. Furthermore, while the previous three cases mentioned provide examples
of courts refusing to enforce no-hire agreements because of their effects as a restraint of
trade, many jurisdictions uphold virtually identical agreements according to the same
restraint of trade rationale.
88 Haase & Mungerson, supra note 11, at 278.89 Roger T. Brice & Burton L. Reiter, Drafting Employment-Related Agreements, in
LIT. & ADMIN. PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, 762 PRAC. L. INST. 215, 227 (2007).
90Id. at 229.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 227.
93 Brice & Reiter, supra note 89, at 227.
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While every state acknowledges the importance of enforcing these
agreements in certain situations, some courts are more protective of
employers' rights, and others of employees' rights.94 Illinois, California
and Georgia are three prime examples of states that are exceedingly wary to
enforce noncompetition agreements. 95 In California, for example, post-
employment noncompetition agreements are essentially prohibited by
statute.96 Georgia has also taken a unique approach: "under Georgia law,
[the] level of scrutiny applied to a covenant not to compete depends on
whether it is ancillary to the sale of a business or ancillary to
employment." 97 If the agreement is ancillary to the sale of a business, the
level of scrutiny is lower and objectionable portions may be "blue-
penciled. 9 8 If the covenant is ancillary to employment, Georgia law is
much more protective of employee rights; the courts apply strict scrutiny
and refuse to blue-pencil objectionable provisions, instead holding the
entire agreement unenforceable. 99
There are two primary justifications for an employee protective
rationale: (1) employees should be free to bargain for their labor, and (2)
there is a public policy interest in maximizing available services.' 0 0
However, even in states like Georgia that are highly protective of workers'
rights, a carefully drafted agreement that is reasonable in duration, scope
and necessary to protect the employer will most likely be enforceable.'0 l
There are several different approaches that states may take if they
determine that a covenant is overbroad. Depending on the state, the
agreement will be: "(a) held invalid, (b) modified and enforced to the extent
it is reasonable, or (c) modified and enforced only if and to the extent the
overbroad portions can be 'blue-penciled.' 10 2 Blue-penciling is a process
where a court will modify an unenforceable agreement to the extent
necessary to render it enforceable.
94 See generally John Dwight Ingram, Covenants Not to Compete, 36 AKRON L. REv.
49, 50 (2002).
95 Brice & Reiter, supra note 89, at 229.
96 Id.; See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (2008).
97 Palmer& Cay, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 404 F.3d 1297, 1303 (11 th. Cir.
2005).
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Ingram, supra note 94, at 49-50.
l01 Jeffrey Klein, Amy M. Rubin & Kenneth P. Gavsie, Drafting Employment-Related
Agreements, in LIT. & ADMIN. PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, 762 PRAC. L. INST.
143, 184 (Oct. 2007).
102 Brice & Reiter, supra note 89, at 228.
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1. Applying the Restrictive Covenant Approach to Mergers &
Acquisitions
Similar to both the antitrust and restraint of trade approaches, most
states applying the restrictive covenant approach are highly protective of
no-hires executed ancillary to the sale of a business. However, at least one
court has struck down such an agreement as unreasonable and thus
unenforceable under state restrictive covenant law.' 03 The no-hire provision
at issue was executed as part of a confidentiality agreement pursuant to a
proposed sale of Pactiv's subsidiary to Menasha °4  Pactiv required
Menasha to sign the no-hire before it would provide any access to the
financial information of the subsidiary.0 5 The restriction applied for three
years to all management-level employees worldwide at more than 100
direct or indirect subsidiaries of Pactiv, plus any future subsidiaries or
divisions that might one day be established.
10 6
The agreement was executed in April of 2000.107 Pactiv brought
suit following Menasha's hiring of a former Pactiv employee in July
2002.108 Pactiv claimed that the agreement was not subject to Illinois law
governing restrictive covenants because the agreement was executed
pursuant to a confidentiality agreement, as opposed to a non-competition
agreement. 1° 9 The court rejected this argument, concluding, "The public
policy implications of these restrictive covenants are identical.", 1" 0
Since the no-hire provision constituted a restrictive covenant, the
court then applied Illinois law to determine its enforceability."' To be
enforceable under Illinois law, the restrictive covenant must be "reasonable
in geographical and temporal scope and necessary to protect a legitimate
business interest of the employer."' 1 2 Additionally, the court considered its
effect upon the general public, and the hardship imposed upon the party not
seeking enforcement. 13  Ultimately, the court determined that the
geographical limitations and scope were overly broad, encompassing more
than necessary to protect Pactiv's legitimate business interests.114 The court
then noted that although Pactiv had a legitimate interest in preventing
Menasha from misusing confidential information, Pactiv had not
103 Pactiv Corp. v. Menasha Corp., 261 F.Supp.2d 1009, 1014 (N.D. 11. 2003).
104Id. at 1011.
105 id.
106 Id.
107 id.
108 Id. at 1012.
109 Pactiv, 261 F.Supp.2d at 1012.
"OId. at 1013.
... Id.at 1012.
112 Id. at 1013 (citing Woodfield Group v. DeLisle, 295 Ill. App. 3d 935, 937 (Il1. App.
Ct. 1998)).
113 Pactiv, 261 F.Supp.2d at 1013.
1141d. at 1014.
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demonstrated the necessity of a three year ban on hiring any employees
worldwide. 15
At the outset of the trial Pactiv requested that, if found
unenforceable, the court blue-pencil the agreement to the extent necessary
to render it enforceable.' 16 In support of this request, Pactiv referenced the
severability clause in the agreement, which provided that if any portion of
the agreement was unenforceable, it should be disregarded and the
remaining portions should be enforced." 7 Under Illinois law, a court has
the discretion to choose to blue-pencil an agreement, or the court may strike
down the agreement entirely." 8 When a court is considering whether to
blue-pencil an agreement, "the fairness of the restraint initially imposed is a
relevant consideration for the court in deciding whether to modify the
restraining provision."'" 9 Furthermore, pursuant to Illinois law, the court
should consider the potential adverse impact of modification, which is to
discourage "narrow and precise draftsmanship"' 20 by allowing businesses to
draft overbroad restrictions and rely on the court to modify such restrictions
to the extent necessary to be enforceable. Upon analysis of these
considerations, the Illinois court declined to blue-pencil the agreement.' '
This case is significant for two reasons. First, it is the only case
this author discovered where a no-hire executed ancillary to the sale of a
business was found to be unenforceable. As previously discussed, almost
every court will appreciate the economic necessity of such agreements,
provided the restrictions are reasonable. This introduces the second point:
the restrictions in Pactiv were excessive-they applied for three years to all
management-level employees worldwide at more than 100 subsidiaries,
plus any future subsidiaries or divisions that might be established. 22 The
fact that the court refused to blue-pencil the agreement, despite the
severability clause, suggests that the Court sought to teach Pactiv a lesson,
as opposed to expressing an opinion about the enforceability of such
clauses in general.
2. Applying the Restrictive Covenant Approach to Employee Staffing
Contracts
.
5 1d. at 1015.
116 Id.
17 Id. at 1016.
"
8 1d. at 1015 (citing Arpac Corp v. Murray, 226 Il. App. 3d 65, 80 (1st Dist. 1992));
See also Corroon & Black of Illinois, Inc. v. Magner, 145 Ill. App. 3d 151, 166 (1st
Dist. 1986).
"9 Pactiv, 261 F.Supp.2d at 1015 (citing Arpac, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 79-80).
2 Pactiv, 261 F.Supp.2d at 1015 (citing Eichmann v. Nat'l Hosp. & Health Care
Servs., 308 I1. App. 3d 337, 348 (Il1. App. Ct. 1999)).121 Pactiv, 261 F.Supp.2d at 1017.
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THE ENFORCEABILITY OF NO-HIRE PROVISIONS
Parties challenging the enforcement of no-hires have experienced
more success when the no-hire was executed pursuant to a contractual
arrangement with other employers, compared with those executed ancillary
to the sale of a business. The difficulty in enforcing these types of
agreements again reflects the tension between the two underlying legal
principles-the right of employees to accept jobs of their choice and the right
of employers to protect their assets and remain free from unfair
competition. 123
This tension is compounded by the fact that the affected employees
often do not have notice of the no-hires executed by their employers. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed this issue in 2002,124 and their holding
sent a chilling message to many employers. The case involved an
agreement between plaintiff Heyde, the owner of Greenbriar Rehabilitation,
a provider of physical therapists to nursing home facilities, and defendant
Dove Healthcare, a nursing home operator.1 25 The two companies executed
a no-hire that restricted Dove from hiring any employee of Greenbriar
during the course of the agreement and for one year thereafter.1 26 The
agreement also called for liquidated damages equal to fifty percent of the
hired employee's annual salary, in the event the no-hire was breached.
127
Shortly after the agreement terminated, Dove breached the no-hire,
extending employment to one current and three former employees of
Greenbriar 1 28 Greenbriar sued to obtain liquidated damages pursuant to the
contract. 129
The Wisconsin Supreme Court defined the issue as "whether a no-
hire provision contained in a contract between employers, without the
knowledge and consent of the affected employees, is unenforceable as an
unreasonable restraint of trade."' 130 It is important to note that although the
court framed the issue as involving a restraint of trade, they analyzed the
case under Wis. Stat. §103.465, which deals with restrictive covenants in
employment contracts.13 1 Greenbriar vehemently contested the application
of this code section, because the agreement was between employers and
Wis. Stat. § 103.465 refers to agreements between an employer and an
employee.1 32 However, the court rejected this argument, citing the purpose
of the code section-to invalidate covenants that impose unreasonable
123 Wright, supra note 4, at 89.
124 Heyde Companies, Inc. v. Dove Healthcare, LLC, 654 N.W.2d 830 (Wis. 2002).
125 Id. at 832.
126 id.
127 id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Heyde, 654 N.W.2d at 833.
131 Id.. However, it is possible that the Court may have viewed it as a restrictive
covenant out of necessity because the state lacked an appropriate restraint of trade
statute; see also Wis. Stat. § 103.465 (2002).13 2Heyde, 654 N.W.2d at 833-34; see also Wis. STAT. § 103.465.
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restraints on employees, regardless of how they are formed or what they are
called. 133
The court then applied a five-factor reasonableness analysis to
determine enforceability. 34 To be enforceable the "covenant must: (1) be
necessary to protect the employer; (2) provide a reasonable time limit; (3)
provide a reasonable territorial limit; (4) not be harsh or oppressive to the
employee; and (5) not be contrary to public policy.' ' 35 Applying this test,
the court concluded that the covenant failed to meet several criteria.
36
First, the agreement was not necessary because Heyde could have protected
its interest by requiring its employees to sign a covenant not to compete.
37
Second, the court determined that the contract was harsh and oppressive to
the employees.138 Third, the contract was contrary to public policy. 39 The
employees had no knowledge of the agreement entered into by their
employer, and they were never asked to sign a non-compete.140 In addition
to the lack of knowledge, the Court suggested that the lack of consideration
offered in exchange for the restriction was problematic.' 4' Ultimately, this
case is a troublesome sign for employers seeking to enforce no-hires in
Wisconsin, and a foreboding signal to employers in other states whose
courts have yet to specifically address the issue.
In addition to the plain message of the holding, this case is
important in another regard. The case suggests that notice to the employee
may be a prerequisite to enforceability in some states. 42  This would
effectively require employers to execute non-competes with all of their
employees, instead of no-hires with other businesses. Alternatively, if the
no-hire is to be enforceable without an employer/employee non-compete, it
suggests that the employer may be required to offer the employee adequate
consideration in exchange for the restriction on her rights. 43 While the
impact of this case is yet to be seen on a national level, Illinois has
specifically rejected the conclusion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court,1 and
the Virginia Supreme Court expressed a contrary approach and result when
' Heyde, 654 N.W.2d at 834.
134 Id. at 835.
135 id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
'
38 Id. at 836.
139 Heyde, 654 N.W.2d at 836.
140 id.
141 Id,
142 See id. at 838-39.
143 Haase and Mungerson, supra note 11, at 301.
'44 H&M Commercial Driver Leasing, Inc. v. Fox Valley Containers, Inc., 209 III. 2d
52, 60-64 (I11. 2004).
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faced with a similar contractual provision several years prior to the
Wisconsin decision.
145
After the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the Supreme
Court of Illinois rejected the Wisconsin approach when faced with a
factually similar case. The case involved a no-hire agreement between
plaintiff H&M, a lessor of truck driving services, and defendant Fox Valley
Containers.146  The agreement prohibited Fox Valley from hiring any
drivers supplied by H&M for the duration of the contract, and for one year
thereafter. 147 In the event of a breach, the agreement called for liquidated
damages of $15,000, as well as attorney fees. 148 Subsequently, Fox Valley
breached the agreement, and H&M sued for enforcement.1
49
The court considered the approaches of both the Virginia Supreme
Court and the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and determined that the former
was the proper approach.150  To reach this conclusion, the court
characterized the agreement as a restraint of trade, and explicitly rejected
the characterization as a restrictive covenant.' 5' For an agreement that
operates as a restraint of trade to be enforceable under Illinois law, the
provision must be: (1) reasonable, (2) not injurious to the public, (3) not
cause undue hardship upon the affected individual, and (4) the restraint is
not greater than necessary to protect the promisee.152  The court then
determined that the provision was reasonable to protect H&M's sole
business assets, its drivers, from being poached by customers.
153
Furthermore, the court pointed out that H&M drivers were free to seek
employment with any employer except Fox Valley, and that if Fox Valley
desperately wanted a certain employee and could not wait for one year, they
could elect to pay liquidated damages. 154 Furthermore, the provision was
narrowly tailored because Fox Valley was not precluded from hiring all
H&M employees, rather the agreement covered only those employees who
had been provided to Fox Valley by H&M.1 55 The court then determined
145 Therapy Services, Inc. v. Crystal City Nursing Center, Inc., 389 S.E.2d 710 (Va.
1990). Holding that such an agreement was not a restrictive covenant, but rather a
contract in restraint of trade. As such, the court determined it would be upheld unless it
was found to be unreasonable or injurious to society. The Court then determined the
agreement was enforceable, because it was reasonable to protect the interests of the
employer and was not injurious to the public.
146 H&M Commercial Driver Leasing, 209 11. 2d at 54.
147 Id. at 54.
148 Id.
1491 Id. at 55.
"' Id. at 60-64.
151 Id
152 H&M Commercial Driver Leasing, 209 I11. 2d at 64; see also Bauer v. Sawyer, 134
N.E.2d 329 (Ill. 1956).
153 H&M Commercial Driver Leasing, 209 Il1. 2d at 64.
154 Id.
155 id.
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that the provision was not injurious to the public, because there was no data
suggesting that the availability of truck drivers in the area was
diminished. 156 Lastly, there was no evidence that the provision inflicted
undue hardship on the employees. 157 For all of these reasons, the Illinois
Supreme Court upheld the enforceability of the agreement.
58
It is interesting to note the specificity of the analysis the court
employed to reach their decision. Most importantly, the court noted that
there was no data to suggest that the availability of truck drivers in the area
was diminished. 159 This dictum seems to leave open the opportunity to
challenge a similar case in the future, especially one involving larger
companies with greater potential to affect the availability of services in a
given market.
The Illinois Supreme Court was also careful to distinguish a similar
case from the Illinois Appellate Court, Szabo Food Service v. Cook County,
which recognized an exception to enforceability. 60 In that case, Szabo
entered into a contract with Cook County to provide food service managers
for the county jail.161 The contract contained a provision that restricted
Cook County from hiring or otherwise employing any of Szabo's
managerial employees during the contract, as well as for a period of six
months following termination of the contract. 62  After the contract
terminated, Cook County hired the Canteen Corporation to handle food
services at the jail. 163 Shortly thereafter, the Canteen Corporation hired four
former managers of Szabo to work at the jail. 164 Subsequently, Szabo
sought an injunction to prevent Canteen Corporation from employing the
four former Szabo managers at the jail. 165 In its complaint, Szabo alleged
that it had established three rights in need of protection: (1) the right to have
the covenant enforced, (2) the right to protect the confidential information
its managers acquired, such as specialized procedures, systems, methods
and data, and (3) the right to retain its employees without malicious
interference from its competitors. 166
The Illinois court began its analysis by characterizing the
agreement as a restrictive covenant. 67 Next, the court stated the general
rule that, "courts will enforce a restrictive covenant only if its impact on the
156 Id.at 64-65.
157 Id. at 65.158 id.
159 H&M Commercial Driver Leasing, 209 11. 2d at 64-65.
160 Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Cook County, 160 I1. App. 3d 845 (1987).
161 Id. at 846.
162 id.
163 Id.
'64 Id. at 846-47.
165 Id. at 847.
166 Szabo Food Service, 160 II. App. 3d at 848.
167 Id. at 848.
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parties to the contract and the public is reasonable."'168 The critical issue in
this case was that along with restricting the rights of the county, the
covenant also restricted Canteen Corporation from hiring former Szabo
managers to work at the jail.169 Regarding Szabo's first claim, neither
Canteen Corporation nor the Szabo managers were parties to the initial
contract. 170 As such, the court determined that the covenant created an
unreasonable restriction on the freedom of contract of both parties, and
Szabo had no right to enforce the covenant.' 7' The court quickly dismissed
Szabo's second claim as well, noting that even if it could prove the
existence of confidential information, Szabo did not treat this information
as confidential, because they had not taken reasonable means to protect the
information, such as executing restrictive covenants with the managers. 72
Finally, the third claim was also dismissed, because to succeed in a claim
for tortious interference, Szabo was required to demonstrate that it would be
irreparably injured by lack of enforcement, and the court found that there
was no such irreparable injury. 173
III. THE POTENTIAL FOR FORUM SHOPPING
In 2005, a case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for
Eleventh Circuit set a troublesome precedent for parties seeking
enforcement of no-hires.' 74 The dispute involved the enforceability of a
covenant not to compete between a company with a multi-state presence
and an employee. 75 The employee challenging enforceability brought suit
in Georgia to take advantage of Georgia's pro-employee laws regarding the
enforceability of such agreements.176 The importance of the decision is that
not only did the Eleventh Circuit determine that the agreement was
unenforceable under Georgia law, but the Court also held that the
unenforceability extended to any other lawsuit between the parties, even
lawsuits filed outside of Georgia. 177 In other words, an employee seeking
to challenge enforceability may fare well simply by rushing to Georgia to
challenge the restriction (assuming jurisdiction can properly be obtained in
168 Id.; see also Junkunc v. S. J. Advanced Technology & Mfg. Corp., 498 N.E.2d 1179
(I11. App. 3d 1986).
169 Szabo Food Service, 160 I11. App. 3d at 848.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 849.
172 Id. at 849-50.
171 Id. at 850.
114 Palmer & Cay, 404 F.3d at 1297.
175 Id. at 1303.
176 Don Benson & Stephanie Bauer Daniel, New Race to Tennessee and Georgia
Courthouses Over Non-Competition Agreements, 41 TENN. B.J. 18, 18 (Oct. 2005)
(Georgia has a strong public policy that disfavors restraints on trade and is one of the
most difficult states in which to enforce such an agreement).1 77Id. at 25.
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Georgia). 78 If the employee is successful, the claim and issue preclusive
effect of the ruling may prevent the employer from enforcing the agreement
in other jurisdictions as well.1 79 This case could be extremely troublesome
for employers with connections to Georgia or employers whose employees
could otherwise obtain proper jurisdiction in Georgia. 80
IV. CONCLUSION
Moving forward, it appears likely that the majority of courts that
address no-hires will continue to interpret them as contracts in restraint of
trade or restrictive covenants. A party seeking enforcement will generally
prefer the court to use the former. The exception to this general rule arises
when a state has a statute that essentially prohibits contracts in restraint of
trade, but permits some restrictive covenants, such as South Dakota.' 81
Despite the prevalence of the contracts in restraint of trade and
restrictive covenants approaches, several cases recently decided in the Third
and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have suggested that the antitrust
approach may once again be a viable option to contest enforcement of no-
hires.1 82 Although the no-hires in both Eichorn and Deich-Keibler were
enforced, both circuits determined the employee had standing to sue under
antitrust laws and carefully scrutinized the claims.' 83  Under the right
circumstances, it may be worthwhile to challenge enforceability under the
antitrust approach.
84
Regardless of the approach, almost every court will enforce a no-
hire provision executed ancillary to the sale of a business. 85  Courts
recognize that a rational buyer will be wary to invest if her targeted asset,
human capital, could disappear shortly after the close of the transaction. 86
The only exception to this general rule that this author has discovered
involved a no-hire provision that contained excessive prohibitions.' 87
On the other hand, parties have had less success enforcing no-hires
in situations where one company executes a contract to provide employees
178 Id.
7 9 Id. at 24-25; See Palmer & Cay, 404 F.3d at 1310.
180 Benson & Daniel, supra note 176, at 25; See Palmer & Cay, 404 F.3d at 1310.
181 Densmore, 583 N.W.2d at 125; Haase & Mungerson, supra note 11, at 295.
182 Eichorn, 248 F.3d at 131; Deich-Keibler, 243 Fed.Appx. at 164.
"83 Eichorn, 248 F.3d at 131; Diech-Keibler, 243 Fed.Appx. at 164.
184 A good case to challenge enforceability under the antitrust approach would involve a
provision that could potentially restrict a large number of employee's rights and
negatively impact the availability of services in a given industry. The argument against
enforceability is stronger as the potential anti-competitive effect on the industry
increases. Similarly, lack of notice to the affected parties may strengthen the argument
in some jurisdictions.
185 See, Henry & Miller, supra note 1, at 40.
186 Id.
"' See Pactiv, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 1011.
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or services to another company. This has been true under both the restraint
of trade approach 188 and the restrictive covenant approach. 18 9 Additionally,
lack of notice to the affected employee(s) has been a critical factor in
certain jurisdictions. 90 The Heyde case also suggested that a no-hire may
not be enforceable if the employer could have protected its interest by
requiring the employee to sign a non-compete.' 9' Moving forward, it will
be interesting to see if South Dakota applies this rigorous standard to cases
involving no-hires executed ancillary to the sale of a business. The opinion
seems to suggest as much, 192 but the matter is not squarely addressed and
such an interpretation would be a stark departure from the general
enforceability of no-hires executed ancillary to the sale of a business.
Finally, employers seeking to enforce no-hires should be aware of
the decision by the Eleventh Circuit regarding the potential for plaintiffs to
forum shop. 193  After Palmer & Cay, a party seeking to challenge
enforceability may fare well simply by rushing to Georgia to challenge the
restriction, taking advantage of Georgia's pro-employee laws regarding
enforceability. 194 Employers that could be subject to jurisdiction in Georgia
should be wary of this foreboding Eleventh Circuit decision.
188 See Densmore, 583 N.W.2d at 125; Club Properties, 348 S.E.2d at 919; VL Systems,
152 Cal. App.4th at 708.
189 Heyde, 654 N.W.2d at 830.
190 See, e.g. Densmore, 583 N.W.2d at 128.
'9' See Heyde, 654 N.W.2d at 831.
192 See id. at 831, 838-39.
' See Palmer & Cay, 404 F.3d at 1297.
194 Benson & Daniel, supra note 176, at 25; See, Palmer & Cay, 404 F.3d at 1297.
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